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NOTE AND COMMENT
SAVZGUARDING THE CRIMINAL DmENDANT.-Every now and then a new
attack is made somewhere in the United States upon the rule prohibiting
comment before the jury upon the fact that the defendant in a criminal
case has not testified as a witness in his own behalf. At the present time
an effort of this kind is being made in the Michigan legislature, and the
introduction of the bill drew quite a little storm of protest from the State
press as a dangerous inroad upon our ancient guarantees of personal liberty
and security. In fact, however, it directly touches nothing more ancient
than a statutory privilege which dates from the year i86i. By the Public
Acts of that year the disability of parties to actions to testify as witnesses
in this State was removed, but it was expressly provided that defendants in
criminal cases could not be compelled to testify, but might do so or not
at their own pleasure. (Act No. 125, §2). In 1881 an amendment to this
statute was passed providing, as to the defendant in a criminal case, that
"his neglect to testify shall not create any presumption against him, nor
shall the court permit any reference or comment to be made to or upon such
neglect." (Pub. Acts, 188I, No. 245). And this is the form it retains in
the Judicature Act. (Ch. 17, §64).
Conceiving this statute to be merely a legislative interpretation of the
constitutional provision that "No person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself' (Const. z85o, Art. VI, §32; Const
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igog, Art. II, §16), the legislature is considering the proposal of a constitu-
tional amendment to permit such comment. And this is probably necessary,
for judicial opinion seems to incline toward the view that comment upon a
failure .to testify is a violation of this provision against compulsory self-
'incrimination. CooMY, CONST. LIM- (7th Ed.) 447; People v. Tyler, 36 Cal.
522; State v. Camtieron, 4o Vt. 555; Commonwealth v. Harlow, 1io Mass. 411;
Commonwealth v. Scott, 123 Mass. 239. Only in Maine, it appears, has such
comment been expressly held to be compatible with this constitutional priv-
ilege. State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200, 217; State v. Banks, 78 Me. 49o. The
New Jersey cases are not germane because in that State the constitution does
not have a similar provision. Parker v. State, 61 N. J. 1,. 3o8.
The wisdom of the rule prohibiting comment upon a defendant's failure
to testify is a matter which may well be questioned. In the first place,
there is an artificiality and lack of candor in the ostrich-like refusal to
admit the existence of a perfectly obvious fact. As the Supreme Court of
New Jersey says, the inference which follows from a failure to testify "is
natural and irresistible. It will be drawn by honest jurymen, and no in-
structions will prevent it. Must a court refrain from noticing that which
is so plain and forcible an indication of guilt?" Parker v. State, supra.
But a more serious objection is that the rule destroys a perfectly reliable
and legitimate means for aiding the jury to reach a just verdict. Fleeing
from arrest, giving contradictory or- improbable accounts of the matters in
issue, refusing to account for the possession of stolen property,--ll these
are acts which suggest inferences as to guilt which are conceded to be
proper for the jury to consider. Conduct at the trial in refusing to give
testimony which could ordinarily be damaging only if the defendant were
-guilty, is an act equally suggestive of inference. If the conduct of the
defendant before the trial is available, why should his conduct at the trial
be deemed too dangerous and unjustly prejudicial for the jury to consider?
The rule evinces an astounding lack of confidence in the jury.
This much is clear, that the rule here considered has nothing to do with
* due process of law, and is not guaranteed to the citizens of the several States
by the United States Constitution. It is at most a mere special application
of a more general rule, namely, against self-incrimination, and even this
latter rule is merely one of expediency and "has no place in the jurisprudence
of civilized and free countries outside the domain of the common law, and
it is nowhere observed among our own people in the search for truth out-
side the administration of the law." Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78,
113. And it is also clear that in England and her colonies, where the
guarantees of the common law are heldjin as high regard as with us, no
such rule as that prohibiting comment on failure to testify is recognized.
Regina v. Rhodes [i899] 1 Q. B. 77; Kops v. Regina [1894] App. Cas. New
South Wales, 65o, affirming Id., 14 N. S. Wales L. Rep. i5o.
It is also interesting to note that the large and influential Law Reform
Committee of the .New York Bar Association, in a report made in De-
cenber, j914, unanimously recommended the enactment of legislation similar
io that now proposed in the Michigan legislature.
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A corollary to the rule against comment is involved in the recent and
much discussed case of Caminetti, et al. v. United States, 37 Sup. Ct. W92,
decided Jan. i5, 1917. In that case the defendant took the stand and testified
as to events up to a certain point, but he stopped short there and refused
to testify further. This failure to testify to subsequent events was put
before the jury by an instruction from the court as evidence for their
consideration. It was contended on behalf of the defendant that this was
error, under the federal statute (Act of March i6, 1878, 20 Stat. 30, c. 37)
which had been held to prohibit comment on-a failure to testify. Wilson v.
United States, 149 U. S. 6o. The Supreme Court of the United States held,
affirming the Circuit Court of Appeals below, that when the defendant took
the stand he voluntarily relinquished his privilege of silence together with
the immunity froril comment thereon, and could not stop his testimony at
any point he saw fit "without subjecting his silence to the inferences to be
naturally drawn from it." The same point had previously been decided
the other way by two United States Circuit Courts of Appeals. Balliet v.
United States, 129 Fed. 689, 64 C. C. A. 2oi; Myrick v. United States, 219
Fed. x, i34 C. C. A. 61g. The decision in the Diggs case is in harmony
with the generally accepted view. WiamoR, Evi., §2273(4), and note.
R. R. S.
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